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S INCE the Federal Reserve changed its operating
proceduresin late 1979 to achieve greater controlover
monetary aggregate growth, money stock (Ml) growth
has been highly volatile.1 This volatility continued
through 1982: Ml grew at annual rates of 1.6.7 percent
from November 1981 to January 1982, 3.0 percent
from January to July 1982, and 13.1 percent fronm July
to December 1982.
Increased volatility in money growth can produce
adverse economic consequences under certain condi-
tions. Both economictheory and evidence suggest that
substantial short-run deviations in moneygrowth from
its longer-run trend affect the growth of spending and
real economic activity.2 For example, as chart 1 illus-
An earlier cersion ofthis paper wa.s presented at a Business Ecu-
nonmie.s and Pnhlic Policy Workshop at Indiana Unicer.sity. We
would like to thank all the participants fur helpful conmments,
especially Lawrence S. Dacidsurm and Michele Fratianni,
‘For exammmple, the standard deviation ofquarterly Nil growth frommm
IV/!979 tui IV/1982 is 5.91. In contrast, the standard deviatiomm for
Nil growth fm’um lV/1976 to 111/1979 was 1.45.
Some mayarguethat this conmparison is misleading, because tIme
fluctmmatiuns in recent years likely will flatten umut liver time as
evolving seasonal patterns are captured in the recalculation of
seasonal factors, Others, Imowever, have iieen highly skeptical of
revisinmms in seasonal factors, argniumgthat such revisions artificially
smnooth away outliers. For example, William Poole ammd Charles
Lieberman, “Improving Nionetary Control,” Brookings Papers on
EconomicActicity (2:1972), pp. 293—335, have stated that “one of
the dammgcrs of the X-I1 model is that uiutliers are all too easily
explained away by a superficial appeal to chammging seasummals” (p.
332).
2
Thistype uifanalysis was presemmted firstby Clark\%‘arhurton, “Bammk
Reserves and Business Fluctuations,” Journal of the American
Statistical Association (Decemmmlmer 1948), pp. 547—58, reprimmted imm
Clark Warhurton. Depresstun, Inflation, and Monetary Policy:
Selected Papers 1945—19,53 (The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966), pp.
36—47. Ammalyses in this traditiun also are presented in N’lilton
Fm’iedmnan and Anna J. Sclmwartz, “Mommey and Business Cycles,”
ReviewofEconomics and Statistics(Supplemerut: Fehrnamy 1963),
pp. 32—78; William Poole, “The Relationship of Monetary Dcccl-
eratiummsto Business Cycle Peaks: Ammother Lookat the Evidemmce,”
Journal of Finance ~umme1975), pp. 697—712; ammd nmost recently
Nlilton Friedma,m, “Misleading Unanimnity,” N’ewsu’eek (February
7, 1983), p. 56.
trates, largenegative deviationsofmoney growthfrom
its trend have been associated with each period of
economic decline since 1958.
The increased volatility in money growth has led
many observers to question whether the Federah Re-
serve has the ability to control money growth
adequately.3 Some analysts have suggested that the
Fed must make certain technical changes, such as
implementing contemporaneous reserve accounting,
altering discount rate policy and restructuring reserve
requirements, to better control the money stock.
This articleexamines whether more stable growthof
the money stock could have been achieved in 1982
without anyof the proposed technical changes. To this
end, two simple money stock control procedures are
used to simulate money growth in 1982. One proce-
dure involvesincreasing the mnonetary base at a steady
rate. The other involves changing base growth to
offset expected money multiplier changes. The latter
procedure is shown to achieve the hypothetical annual
growth target with little volatility in quarterly money
growth.
tm
Fur contrasting views on this issue, see Milton Friednmaxm, “l’he
Wayward Money Snppiy,” Newsweek (Decemnber27, 1982), p. 58;
“The Pitfalls of Mechanical Munetarismn,” The Morgan Guaranty
Survey (February 1981), pp. 8—13; and Milton Friedman, “Improv-
ing Monetary Policy,” Newsweek (July 28. 1980), p. 60. More
sophisticated analyses are presented in Board ofGovernors of the
Federal Reserve System, New Monetary Control Procedures,
Federal Resen’e Staff Study, vols, 1 amid 2 (Board uifGovernors.
198!).
One argumnent is that “large. swings” in the denmand for msmommey
are direct causes of observed variability in money growth. For
example, see “Statement by Lyle Gramley, memnber, Board of
Governorsofthe Federal Reserve System, before the Subcommit-
tee on Donmestic Monetary Policy umf the House Cummnittee on
Banking, Fimmance and Urban Affairs, March 3, 1982,” Federal
Reserve Bulletin (March 1982), pp. 174-78. Fur an alternative
analysis, see Scott E. klein, “Short-Run Money Growth Volatility:
Evidence of Misbehaving Money Demand?” this Review lJune/
July 1982), pp. 27—36; and Kenneth C. Froewiss, “Speaking Softly
But Carrying a Big Stick,” Ecunomic Research (Goldman Sachs,
December 1982).
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[I Two-quarter rate of change.
[~ Twenty-quarter rate of change; data prior to 1st quarter 1964 are Ml on the old basis.
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Table I
Ml Growth Rates in 1982
Monthly GE4Wth Rate t~uaderly i~rowth Rate
P etini nary Rev ed amnam’y - Revised
181 /82 23V’,~ 25%
1/82 82 34 05
2/82—Z182 a is iv.si 1/82 109%
3/82—482 115 18
4fl582 24 86
5/82 6/82 03 7 l/82—U/82 353 33
6/82’- 7/82 03 7
782 8/82 108 108
8/82r 9/82 49 138 11/82—9182 35 63
98210/82 226 155
10/82118 183 144 lWS2lV/82 171 139
118212/82 92 114
2/81 12/82 85 86 IV/81—IV/62 8.5 85
MONEY STOCK GROWI’H iN 1982 the volatility of observed money growth could have
been considered excessive. Because this present
Table 1 lists Nil growth fbr 1982 on a monthly and analysis addresses the issueofreducing the volatility of
quarterly basis. The respective growth rates are calcu- money growth in an ongoing policy setting, we ignore
lated for both preliminary data and the recently re- the reeemmt revisions in money stock numbers; policy-
vised data, which incorporate both benchmark revi- makers would not have had this imiformation in 1982
sions and revised estimates of seasonal factors. It is when decisions were being made.4
apparent that the recent revisioims have smoothed sub-
stantiallvthe fluctuations inboth monthly and quarter-
ly money growth. With the exception of March and ACHIE% INC (;REATER MONEY
April, the revised monthlygrowth rates all are closerto GROWTH CONTROL IN 1982; TWO
the average growth ratc over the period Thus the U I 1RN Ills I PROC m1fl RI ‘s
standard deviation of the monthly growth rates is re-
duced substantially by the revisions: 6.84 vs. 9.59. Could the Fed have achieved a more stable pattern
Similarly, the standard deviation of the quarterly ofmoney growth in 1982 than that evidenced by table
growth rates is 4.73 for the revised series and 6.62 for
the preliminary series. uThis approach is supported by a recent Federal Reserve Board
report dealing with the problem of seasommal adjustment. In that
report, it is stated that “since the original projections [of seasonal
factors] are whatpolicymakers and other users of thedata have to
work withcurrently in making decisions,the revised data may give
an erroneous impression, after the fact, ofwhat the basis for the
decisionwas.” Board ofGovernorsofthe Federal Reserve System,
Seasonal Adjustment of the Monetary Aggregates: Report of the
CommitteeofExperts on SeasonalAdjustment Techniques (Feder-
alReserve Board, 1981), p. 35. Cited in David A. Pierce, “Seasonal
Adjustment of the Monetary Aggregates: Summary ofthe Federal
Reserve’sCommittee Report,“Journal ofBusiness and Economic
Statistics (January 1983), pp. 37—42. Our treatment only adds
realism to the simulations carried out. It does not affect any sub-
stantive conclusiomms aboutcomparing alternative operating proce-
dures: Ifrevised data are used, the constant-base-growth strategy
still results in quarterly money growth volatility in 1982 similar to
that indicated by revised data, but much greater than that associ-
ated with the multiplier monitoring approach.
This suggests that at least part of the volatility in
money growth last year is attributable to poor pre-
liminary data. For example, the revisednumbers indi-
cate that the original estimates ofstrong money growth
in April, October and November all were exaggerated.
Similarly, the original estimates of negative money
stock growth in February, May, June and July were
incorrect; the revised data show that money growth
was positive during these months.
Thefactthat revisionsinmoney stock measures have
reduced the volatility in money growth is comforting,
cx post. For a polieymaker making decisions in 1982,
however, theextent ofthe revisions was unknown and
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1? This question is examined by analyzing two alterna-
tive control procedures, each controlling Ml growth
by altering the adjusted monetary base (hereafter re-
ferred to as base).°
The first procedure involves simply holding the
growth of the base constant over the year.6 Because
there generally is a direct relationship between
changes in the growth rate ofthe base and the money
stock, a constant rate ofbase growth will, on average,
yield a predictable growth rate of money. This
approach produces stable short-run Ml growth,
however, only iftherateofchange ofthe moneymulti-
plier — the connecting link between changes in the
base and money — remains constant over time.
Although this typically is the case over longer periods
of time, it is not true over time spans as short as a
month or a quarter. Thus, even though base and
money growth areclosely related overperiods ofayear
or more, short-run money multiplier changes can
cause short-run money growth to deviate substantially
from any particular base growth. This is the primary
weakness with this procedure.
The second control procedure alleviates the short-
run discrepancies between base arid Ml growth by
anticipatingchanges inthe multiplier and, then, offset-
ting them by appropriate changes inbase growth. This
‘The base is controlled essentially by Fed actions. On the issue of
the Fed’s ability to control the base, see Anatol B. Balhach, “How
Controllable is Money Growth?” this Review (April 1981), pp.
3—12.
That study found that “the Federal Reserve can coimtrol the
monetary base er-en on a meeek/y basis ifit so desires. There is, of
course, no question that itcan doso over longerperiodsoftime-”In
this light, no adjustment in achieving a monetan’ base objective is
made. On measuring the base (on an adjusted basis), see R- Alton
Gilbert, “Revision of time St. Louis Federal Reserve Adjusted
Monetary Base,” thisReview(Decemher 1980),pp. 3—10; andJohn
A. Tatom, “Issues in Measuring An Adjusted Monetary Base,” this
Review (December 1950), pp. 11—29.
°This approach has been advocated in recent statements of the
Shadow Open Market Committee. This is because “[C]urrent
institutional changes have less effect on the growthofthebase than
on most other aggregates.” See “Policy Statement ofthe Shadow
Open Market Committee, March 16. 1981,” Annual Report. Cen-
ter for Research in Govermmment Policy & Business (June 1981),pp.
31—35, especially pp. 33-34. This advocacy also is found in the
September 14, 1981, “Policy Statement” This argummment presup-
poses that stable Ml growth may not be desirable with all ofthe
current institutional changes. In contrast, time present article pre-
supposes that stable Ml growthis desirableand seeks todetermine
the extent to which itmaybe achieved. Ofcourse, thedesirability
ofstable moneygrowth depends on the stability ofthe demand for
money, a matter not addressed in this article. For astudy that also
recommends baseinstead ofmnoneystock targeting, see Leonall C,
Andersen and Denis S. Karnosky, “Some Considerations in the
Use ofMonetary Aggregates for the Implementation of Monetary
Policy,” this Review (September 1977), pp. 2—7.
procedure involves using one-period-ahead multiplier
forecasts to determine the extent to which the base
should be expanded or contracted.’ Two methods of
forecasting money multiplier developments are con-
sidered for this procedure.
The Constant-Base-Growth Procedure
Analysis of Ml growth and its volatility requires
choosing some desired target level or range. In the
analysis which follows, the top of the announced 1982
annual Ml target range —5.5 percent growth — was
selected as a hypothetical operating target.8 Table 2
enumerates the desired monthly level of Nil that
would be consistent with achievingthis growth target
with no short-run variation in Ml growth (see column
1). Because the money stock is the product of the
multiplier and the base, the growth rate of Ml (Ml) is
approximately equal to the growth rate of the money
multiplier (iii) plus the growth rate of the base (AMB):
(1) Ml = rh + AMB.
As equation 1 shows, it is necessary to predict th in
order to determine the appropriate AMB to provide.
During the last 12 years (1970—Si), the level of the
money multiplier has been declining on average; rim has
averaged — 1.1 percent. Thus, over this period, base
growth, on average, exceeded Ml growth by 1.1 per-
cent. This was assumedto continue in 1982. To achieve
the desired Ml growth of 5.5 percent under the base
control procedure considered here, therefore, the
money multiplier is “predicted” to decline at a 1.1
percent rate during 1982. Given the assumed rate of
decline inthe money multiplier, a constant 6.6 percent
rate ofincrease in the base would be needed to yield
the targeted 5.5percent money growth. This required
base path (in levels) is shown in column 3 oftable 2.
The constant-base-growth strategy would have re-
sulted in stable money growthonly ifthe money multi-
plierdeclined ina steady fashion as presumed. During
1982, however, the money multiplier was highly vola-
tile by historical standards (see column 2 of table 2).
For example, based on original data, the difference
between the maximum and minimum levelofthe mul-
A similar argument forusing money multiplier forecasts as a basis
for policy actions is presented in Balbach, “How Controllable is
Money Growth?” and James M. Johannes and Robert H. Rasche,
“Can the Resem’ves Approach to Monetary Control Really ~Vork?”
JournalofMoney, CreditandBanking(August 1981),pp. 298—313,
8
1t should he noted that the Federal Open Market Committee
tesnporarily ended its practice ofadopting short-run targets for Ml
in October 1982, because ofdifficultiesin interpreting its behavior,
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Table 2
Ml Growth Under Constant 6.6 Percent Base Growth
(seasonally adjusted, original data)
Srni.’.ated MI growth rate
Permod Targeted Ml’ Actual multmpmer Smmulatea base’ Smrr’u’alec. Ml Mormthmy Quarterly
B 121 l3~ m2j 51
1281 2.5951
182 $4429 26142 51708 54465 164%
282 4449 25826 17’? 4479 93 78~
382 4468 25809 1726 4455 73
482 4488 25837 1736 4485 84
582 4509 25566 1745 446’ 62 15
682 4529 25374 ~754 445’ 2.7
782 4549 25354 1764 4472 5.8
882 4569 25388 1773 4501 81 4.2
982 4590 25598 1782 4562 175
1082 4610 25893 1792 4640 226
1182 4631 26142 1802 4711 191 170
1282 4651 26096 181 1 2726 39
Sm’nuiated Ml growth December ‘981 to Decomoc’r 1982.72~
Actual Ml growth Decemnber 1981 to December 1982.8 6’~
Bmllmons of do;.ars
tiplier in 1982 was 0.079. During the past decade this
difference was exceeded by multiplier developments
only during 1974.
Column 4 in table 2 shows the simulated money
stocklevels for 1982 holding base growth at a constant
6.6 percent throughout 1982, arid assuming that the
money multiplier would have behaved exactly as it
did.9 Two important results emerge from this simula-
tion. First, the patterns of both monthlyand quarterly
Ml growth produced by the constant-base-growth
approach (columns 5 and 6) are similar to those that
actually occurred. Forexample, the verystrong money
growth observed in January would have been lessened
‘It miglmt he arguedthat tIme actual moneymultiplier pattem’rm would
have been considerably different ifthe Federal Reserve actually
had operated under such a control procedure. In tlsis case, the
resultammt money gm’owth would have been difierent fromn that re-
ported here. This criticismn is predicated on the beliefthat changes
in base growth are assmmciated with changes in the money multi—
pher- This belief is not well supported by recent data, however.
For example, basegrowth was relatively stable in 1982, yet money
multiplier growth was more volatile than any year since 1974.
Moreover, for the period 1979 to 1982, the correlation between
mmmthly base and multiplier growth is amm insignificammt 0.07. Thus,
money multiplier nmovements do not appear to he related signifi-
cantly to monetary base growth.
only slightly by adopting a constant-base-growth
strategy (23.1-percent vs. 16.4 percent). Nil growth
fromJanuary through July 1982would havebeen even
weaker than actually occurred (1.2 percent vs. 0.3
percent), and the strong Ml growth from July to De-
cember 1982 would have been reduced only slightly
(15.1 percent vs. 14.2 percent).
The similarity between actual and simulated Ml
growth for 1982 is not an aberration; base growth was
indeed fairly stable last year. The volatility in Ni
growth last year was attributable, in large part, to
money mnultiplier developments, not erratic base
growth. Thus, those critical ofthe Fed for the volatile
money growth last year should recognize that a con-
stant-base-growth strategy would not have mnitigated
this problem.
The second important finding is that Ml growth
from December 1981 to December 1982 would have
exceeded the hypothetical target by 1.7 percentage
points if the base had grown at a steady 6.6 percent
over the year. The hypothetical growth rate target was
5.5 percent; Ml growth would have been about 7.2
percent under a policy of constant base growth. This
“miss” of the annual Ml target occurred because the
money multiplier essentially was unchanged between
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Table 3
MI Growth Using Last Month’s Multiplier as a Forecast of this Month’s Multiplier
(seasonally adjusted original data)
Stmulated Ml growth rate
PenS Tar9eted Ml Actualmultipher Ommulated be e mrnu ate Ml Month y Quarterty
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5 (6)
12/81 2.5951
1/82 $442.9 26142 $1707 $4462 153%
2/82 4449 25826 1702 4395 166 70%
38 44&8 25809 1730 4485 209
4/82 4488 25837 173.9 4493 78
5/82 4509 5566 745 4462 80 31
682 4529 25374 1771 4495 92
7/82 4549 25354 1793 4545 142
8/8 4569 25388 1802 4575 8 92
982 4590 25598 1808 4628 148
1082 461.0 25893 1801 468. 95
1162 4631 26142 1789 4676 3 70
12/82 4651 26096 1779 4843 81
Sim’nulated Ml Growth. December 1981 to December 1982 5.
Actual Ml Growth Decembe 961 to December 1982 86%
~Siutons ofdollars
curremmt mommtlm s multiplier plus rammdom (rrom (p.r)
xxlnch cin he a sumcd to he zeto on ax er’ a .:b0
(9\ mmmm — um
1
+ p~.
Once the multipl em is fort cast the anmoimnt of h’ise
mm eded to ‘ichiex the de i ci I “~ I of Nil is then
deterrnirmed m’ siduall Os ‘xanm plc I time mnultiphem
is foie ‘ ist to be 2 60 smext month and the targ 1 for NIl
tic x nmoimth is .3450 billion the polics directix xx ould
he to aehiex e ‘i Si 3. 1 billion ($45012.60) im’ise lex ci
next mommth. Imm this \ xx muitipli ‘r hanees t~ tI
extent that timex are forecast arc ofisct bx altc immg time
base to mnaintaiim a desu eel path iot NIl. If time mmmilti
pile t C ~1 ojected to he onh 2 50 nc t mnontlm for
vamnple then tim s )roee ciurc xx uicl require $180 bmi—
liomm (3430/2.50) in I ‘mc to ‘melmie xc the ai e Ml targc
of $450 billion.
December 1981 and December 1982, instead of de—
climmimmg at aim assumed rate of 1.1 percent as it had on
average ox-er the preceding 10 years. Thus, both the
pattern and average level of money grox’’tlm last year
were afi’ecteci by unusual money multiplier develop—
mclmts, cieveiopnmemmts that would imave had adverse
nnpacts on a constammt—hase—growtlm rule.
MONITORING MONTHLY
MULTIPLIER DEVELOPME.NTS
‘I’he previous sectiomm dcrnoimstrates tlmat short—rnmm
mommev nmultiplier mnovenments must somnelmowhe taken
into aecoummt if more stalmie mnoimev growtim is to he
aclmieved. One wax’ to accomplish this is to ohtaimm
one—month—ahead incmev multiplier forecasts amid to
adjust base growth to offset ilmcreases or decreases 1mm
the multiplier. Twoways of doumg timis are considered.
Na.we Forecast: Monthly Monitoring of time
Mnltipiier
The simplest procedure to forecast mmext mommtb’s
nmonex’ multiplier is to assummie tlmat it will equal the
Table 3 summarizes the results for 1982 using timis
technique to acimieve time same steady 5.5 percent
growtim rate of Ml as before. Jim comparisomm to the
constant—base—growth strategy, mosmthlv monitoring of
°Scc Ballmaclm .- ‘how (2mmmmtrollahle is NI onex’ Groxx’tlm?’’
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mntmltiplier dex’elopments mitigates both proimienms of
excessive volatility and missing the annual ohjeetix’e.
The x•’ariahility imm quarterly Ml growtlm is reduced sub-
stantially under the nmuitipher mommitorimmg procedure
(compare columnmms 6 1mm tables 2 and 3). 1mm particular,
this procedure would not hax’e produced the sharp
midyear slowdown in money growth relative to
trendl. The simmiulated mnoney growtlm from 1/1982 to
111/1982 ummcler tlmis procedure would imave been 6.4
percemmt, suhstammtiailv imigher than the 2.8 percent
growtlm simnulateel under the constammt—hase—groxx’th
strategy.
Moreover, it also would Imave produced mnom’e stable’
quarterly growth imm Ml last year than tlmat simuiateei
xvith the constant—base—growth strategy: the standard
deviatiomm ofthe quarterly growtim rates is 6.76 for the
constant—base—growth strategy-and 2.27 for tIme proce-
dure using naive multiplier forecasts. This increased
quarterly stability’ is achiex’ed, imowever, at the ex-
pense ofslightly’ mnore volatile monthly mnoney growtlm.
For example, the standard eleyiatioim of the sinmulated
monthly Ml growth for the commstammt—hase—growth
approach was 10.21; the figure for the simntmiated Nil
growth tmsing the multiplier forecast approach was
11.27 percent.
The increase 1mm the monthly volatility of Ml growth
is a direct commsequence of the procedure itself; time
mnommtimlv mnonitorimmg procedure achieves stable
quarterly mnonev growth by reactimmg quickly to unex-
pected moimthiydisturbances ism the mnoney multiplier.
i’hus, wlmemm the mmmuitiplier declimmeei sharply imm May,
this procedure produced a swift policy respoimse imm
termns of sharply increased base growtlm imm subsequent
mnonths. Consequently, the mimonev stock would hax’e
been nmuch closer to the hypothetical target level imm
August thamm was the ease with the eommstammt—hase—
growtlm strategy.
This simple procedure ofcontrolling Ml growthalso
is mnuch mnore successful than the constammt—hasc—
groxvtlm strategy imm achieying time desired M 1 growth
target of5.5 pereemmt. Ml growtlm frommm December 1981
to December 1982 would Imave beemm 5.3 pereemit tmeier
this simple multiplier forecasting procedure. commm—
pared with a 7.2 percent growth rate under tIme comm—
stant—base—growth strategy.
Ifpolicy were elirected towardachiex’iog stable quar—
ter—to—qmmarter Ml growtim ammd stremmgtimening the Feel’s
almilitv to hit an annual target, the simple teelmnique of
mnonetary eomitrol described here xvouldhe superior to
the constant—hase—gm’owth strategy. It
More Sophisticated Multiplier Forecasts:
Time Ser-ies Techniques
The forecastimmg technique described above — using
last umonths mmiultiplier — is simnpie but ad hoc. There
is no a priori reason to suspect that sucim a forecastimmg
procedure would he especially reliable. Thus, more
sophisticated timne series forecasting models should he
I.-, consmdered. -
Statistical evidence suggests timat omme can miproxe
upon the precedimmg forecasting mnodei, wimich mncrely
uses last mnommths multiplier as a prediction for this
months multiplier. ~ This nprovenmemmt is derived by
developing a timne series mnodei that explains changes
in the multiplier (i.e., m~— mmmi — ~)by’ using the in—
formnation contained in the nomm—ranclomn comnpomment of
theforecast errors fromn equation 2. More formally, the
time series model cbosemm is represemmtedl by’
(3) mm — rrt1_ = ~ + hm ji.~,
opt, rmmti mm g pm’dmcedlmmu’ previously’ imas Iweu simowti to reduce
d
1
uartd’miy mmm 0mm cv vo]at iiitv-ammdi better aclmicve time loIm g—rm mm I (mimjec—
tiye i’m 1980 (in Balimaclm, ‘‘lloxv Commtroilah!e is Nionev Growth?”),
Si muiiar gaim m s also wom mid have lmeemm adlievedi in 1981 - Basedi (mu
fim-st—revised data amid! aimu i ug kmr a I)ec’euii5cr 1980 to l)ecm,mmmhcr
1981 growlii rate of 7,0 pem’cemm t. tim is prod’d%lmmme would imave
‘-ieidied 7,2 lmerc’mmt simmmtmiate I gm’o~vtim,wi tim the lowest quarterly
growtim rate hm’im mg 4,5 t’m’c_x’mit anci time im gimest qm marterlv growtim
mate heimm g 8. 2 pem-eem mt- Time actual growtim for timis period! wsms 0.4
percemmt, xvi tim time qtmam-teriv grov.’th rates rzmmm gimm g frm mm mm 0.5 perecm
to 8,9 Pcm’ee mm t - 2
’the foiiowimmg ammsdvsis (-0mm tim m mmes i mm the trarhit iom m of’ Ecimmard J.
Bomuhoff, - Predieti mm g the Ni ouev Nm mmitipIid’r:.-\ Case Studv fimr time
U- S - smmm d time Netim erlam mds, -,iou r,mo IofMo rme/anj Leo mmoomlea ~ mmlv
1977), plm. 32-5—4.5: Jammmes M- Joimammmmes amidi Robert H - Basehe.
‘‘Predictimmg the NI om 1ev NIuitipher. ‘‘ Iou rim”! of .1.looeta i-mg Lc’o—
mmoflmies ~ulv 1979), pp-3
0
i—25: Jolmau mmes amid Rasdme, ‘‘Cam m the
Reserves Approadm to Niommetary Commtrol Resdiv Wom’k?” amid
NI ichele Fromimtm mmmi am md NI mmstapha N_,’ii)!i. ‘ NIommev Stock Comm tm’ol i mm
the EEC Commmmtries.’’ U eltmcirtm’e/mafthche.s Are/nc (heft 3:1979),
Pp 401—2:3,
-mAs a first ste mm 1mm smmch ammaivsis. time am mtocorm’eiation of tim i. first
di!kre mmcc imm time mmmomm e mmimmitipher (mmm
1
— um —. m was exau mhm edfbr
time m~’~oci famm mmar)’ 1959 tm m i)ed’e mmmlIcr t981, For List mm mom mtim’s
‘mm uItiplier tim ime aim elect ixe fhrec-ast oftimis m mmomm tim’s mmlmmitipher, the
ehammge imm time mm niltilmi icr slmomild mm mt he simmtoeor related - A mm v evi-
denceof’ an tocmmrm’eismt 0mm smmggests that timcrc is i mmlo rmuation i mm tlie
past ii istmmrv of time mm mml lipiier that commId he used! to i mu mmm’ovm’ the’
iorec’ast,
Examum mm mug time an tod’m mrreiatiom m fimmmetiomm oftime mmni lip
1
icr’s tinoe
series imm dicates timat, 10 r time sam mmpic’ pem-iod Jamm uarv 1 959 to I )m,s—
cemmmi mer 1981, time iivpotimes is tImat en m’m’emmt dmsm mmgcs i mm tim t’ mmmti Iti —
mmher are imidepemmdIe mt of past elmammges comm he rejected at the 5
perdem mt signmi fic’ammc-e level-
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Table 4
Ml Growth Using One~Montb-Ahead Money Multiplier Forecast
Estimated Mod* m1 tnt ~ 0002 +~+ 0.196 ~ 1
(seasonallyadjusted original data)
Smrnufated Mi growth rate
Actual Por~cast
Permod Targeted Mi mult p5ev muitplier Smutated base Simulated M Monthly Quarterly
(1) () (3) (4 5 (8 (7)
2,81 25951
1/82 $44 9 2642 25914 $1709 64468 178 ~
2/82 4449 2/5825 26018 170.6 4406 154
3/82 4668 25609 25856 28 4460 16
4/82 4488 25837 5798 1740 4495 97
5/82 4509 25566 2.5809 1 47 4466 78 36
682 4529 5374 25594 1769 4490 66
7/82 4549 5354 2530 791 4541 147
8/82 4569 25380 2384 80.3 4577 190 9
9~82 4590 2.5698 5359 18 0 4833 1 £
0/82 4610 5893 2,5531 lEGS 46 5 11
182 463 26142 2,93 79 469 7
12/82 4651 6096 6049 aS 4660 82
Simulated Ml Growth Deesmba lb Oeeembet 1982
Actua MI Growth flecember 1981 Ic, becenter 1982 &
tmBmuions ofdollars
where p.~ i the errorfrom equation 2. An examination more rehahie model of the multiplier than the naive
of the data revealed that the error in the multiplier model used inthe previoussection, there is really little
process last month (Rn — i) exerted a statistically signifi- substantive difference between the two models. The
cant effect on the change in the multiplier for this naive model (equation 2) suggests that changes imm the
month. Moreover, the analysis indicated the existence multiplier are random disturbances (p.j, while the
ofa slight negative trend in the data. Using this extra time series model (equation 4) only adds a negative
information and estimating the appropriate version of trend term and the impact of last period’s disturbance
equation 3 for the period January 1959 to Decenmher (I’t — 1). Thus, there may well be little difference in the
1981 yielded the following results: forecasts.
(4) mm — Wm. m = 0.002 + p.m + 0.196 p.~ m, The results found in table 4 suggest that this is
indeed the case. The time-series model given by equa-
where agamn P-t represents the random, unforeseen
14 tmon 4 was used to forecast the monthly values of the
mnnovatmon to the multiplier process.
multiplier for 1982 by continuously updating the fore-
While, for this sample, eqtmation 4 is statistically a cast to incorporate last month’s money mnultiplier de-
velopments. The one-step-ahead money multiplier
forecasts are listed in column 3. The table also shows tmm
Ali data mime seasoualiy adjtmsted. The estimated stammdam’d error
of the umodcIm x 0 001 IS and the I lmmmmg Box 9 statmstnc 9~2) the amnount of h m.se mnjection (column 4) required each
distrihtmted as ax’ with 10 degrees offreedom, is 11.53. Because month to achiex’e the hypothetical 5.~percent Ml
time reported 9-statistic is evemm less timamm time 30 pereemmt critical growthpath ifthe multiplier behaved asthe timne series
xaitme(y’=flSO)thcimxpothtsms of mmmdepemmdcmmt rt.smdu dxc mm model predicted In addition the table hsts the It xci
- - and growth of Ml that would have resulted from the
For further rietamls omm thms aptmroacim to forecasting eeormommmic ..
time series, see C. W, J, Granmger a,me
1
Paul Newhold, I”oreeastiug simulated base injections had the multmpImer behaved
Economic Time Series (Aeademmmie Tires
5
, 1977). - as it actually’ did (coiummms 5, 6 and 7).
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The simulated money growth developments using
this procedure are similar to those using the naive
forecast strategy (see table 3). For example, the aver-
age monthly Ml growth simulated in table 4i s5.9
percent; the comparable figimre using the naive model
(table 3, column 5) is 6.2 percent. The quarterly
simulations are also similar; in particular, the two suc-
cessive quarters ofvery weak money growth simulated
under the constant-base-growth strategy are avoided
by either ofthese forecasting procedures.
Because the multiplier forecasts derived from the
naive and sophisticated models are not that different,
the lessons learned from the naive mnodel results are
supported by the evidence found in table 4 for the
more sophisticated model. 15 In particmiiar, this multi-
plier forecasting procedure comes closer than the
constant-base-growth strategy to achieving the Imypo-
thetical Ml growth target. In addition, quarterly vola-
tility in mnoney growth is reduced substantially using
tmm
WImile the 1959—SI sample period resultsindicate sommme statistical
gaimmover time naive model in explaimming ehamges in the mnultiplier,
the forecasting experience from 1982 shows that, as a practical
matter, little wimuld have heen gained from emmmployiogthe more
sophisticated immodel. This is a limited sample 0mm which to draw,
hoxvever, and olme slmmmuld mmot conclude that thesimple no—change
model is equally sufficiemmt in all time periods.
either multiplier forecasting technique.tm6 Thus, if
quarterly money growth fluctuations affect real eco-
nomicactivity as suggested earlier, the multiplier fore-
casting approach to conducting monetary policy
appears superiorto theconstant-hase-groxvth strategy.
CONCLUSION
Monetary policy actions that utilize aconstammt-hase-
growth procedure generally will not achieve stable
short-run money growth. A post-mortem of 1982
money growth indicates that much of the volatility in
money growth last year was attributable to money
multiplier fluctuations, not erratic nionetary base
growth. Consequently, monetary policy aimed at
smoothing the growth of Ml must anticipate and react
to multiplier movements. Thisarticle shows that either
a naive approach to multiplier predictions or a more
sophisticated time series model would have enabled
policymakers to achieve smoother quarter-to-quarter
changes in Ml by varying time groxvth ofthe adjusted
base to offset changes in the multiplier.
‘°For aim earlier analysis ofthis typethat reaches similar eonclmmsiomms,
see Albert E. Burger, ‘The Relationship Between Monetar Base
amid Money: I-low Closef” this Reeiew (October 1975). pp. 3—S.
-
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